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Abstract: A recent surge of work on prediction-driven processing
models — based on Bayesian inference and representation-heavy
models — suggests that the material basis of conscious experience is
secluded and neurocentrically brain bound. This paper develops an
alternative account based on the free energy principle. It is argued
that the free energy principle provides the right basic tools for under-
standing the anticipatory dynamics of the brain within a larger
brain–body–environment dynamic, viewing the material basis of
some conscious experiences as extensive — relational and thoroughly
world-involving.
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1. Introduction
A new theory is creating waves of excitement in the neurosciences,
one ‘rapidly gaining in influence’and deemed ‘set to dominate the sci-
ence of mind and brain in the years to come’ (Hohwy, 2014, p. 1). The
theory is that the brain is an intrinsically proactive and self-organizing
system. It is a vision of the brain as a ‘probabilistic predictive
machine’, implementing Bayesian operations whose function is to
reduce prediction error — i.e. to minimize divergences between top-
down anticipations or predictions and incoming sensory input.
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Prediction-driven processing (PP) is based on a single imperative to
minimize error ‘in the brain’s own (sub-personal) predictions con-
cerning its current and future states’ (Clark, 2012, p. 759; see also
Bubic et al., 2010; Clark, 2013; in press; Friston, 2010; 2011; 2013;
Hohwy, 2013; 2014).
Yet for all their promise, one rendition of PP models — based on
Bayes-optimal inference and representation-heavy models — depict
the material (sub-personal processing) basis of cognition as wholly
brain bound (Hohwy, 2013; 2014). This view of PP is thoroughgoing
in its commitments, threatening ‘to return us to the bad old days of
epistemic internalism’ (Anderson and Chemero, 2013, p. 204), relaps-
ing into an old-fashioned ‘Cartesian’ view, where mind/cognition is
secluded from body and world. But there is a second — slightly less
internalist — formulation of PP models available. As Clark, in his
influential target paper on PP models in Behavioral and Brain Sci-
ences, puts it:
At least on the face of it, the predictive processing story seems to pursue
a rather narrowly neurocentric focus… But dig a little deeper and what
we discover is a model of key aspects of neural functioning that makes
structuring our worlds genuinely continuous with structuring our brains
and sculpting actions. (Clark, 2013, p. 194)
On the face of it, this is a ‘slightly less’ internalist formulation of cer-
tain implications of PP, because — as Clark sees it — these models
overcome any deep schism between mind and world. But does this
continuous, co-constituting view of neural- and niche-construction
imply that the material basis of conscious experience may extend
beyond the brain? As a first pass, if one takes conscious experience as
a kind of cognition, and if one thinks cognition may extend beyond the
brain, then it may seem that the material basis of conscious experience
could extend beyond the brain. But, on Clark’s model, any such infer-
ence would be too quick (see also Wheeler, this issue). Driving this
claim is the presupposition — rooted in Clark’s work on the extended
mind hypothesis (2008; Clark and Chalmers, 1998) — that only some
sub-personal cognitive processes have material realizers comprising
extra-neural resources (Clark, 2012, p. 753; see also Wheeler, 2010).
If this is correct, that only a subset of cognitive processes are realized
in loops entwining brain, body, and world, then this ‘opens a potential
gap’ in relation to conscious experience, since the latter ‘might be (or
might be among) the class of psychological phenomena whose mate-
rial realizers aren’t ever extended’ (Wheeler, this issue). Hence, when
viewed through the lens of the extended mind hypothesis, the sub-
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personal circuits of predictive processing may, from time to time, and
in the right circumstances, extend beyond the confines of the brain
through, for example, action-based structuring of information flows
(Clark, 2013, p. 194). But, when it comes to conscious experience, the
‘material apparatus can still quite reasonably be thought to be wholly
internal’ (Clark, 2012, p. 755). Taken as a pair, Hohwy’s (2013; 2014)
full-blown internalism and Clark’s (2009; 2012) ‘lighter’ version
yield a view of conscious experience as an inner, insulated arena —
one whose sub-personal basis does not comprise anything but the way
that neurodynamics elicit and respond to incoming sensory stimuli. If
this vision is correct, then conscious experience is the result of a cas-
cade of neural-based predictions that best make sense of perturbations
from the ‘outside’ environment. As Hohwy says:
This fits with the idea that conscious experience is like a fantasy or vir-
tual reality constructed to keep the sensory input at bay. It is different
from the conscious experience that is truly a fantasy or virtual reality,
which we enjoy in mental imagery or dreaming, because such experi-
ences are not intended to keep sensory input at bay. But normal percep-
tion is nevertheless at one remove from the real world it is representing.
(Hohwy, 2013, p. 137, italics added)
On Hohwy’s account, experience is a veil of subjectivity at a distance
from body and world. In this paper, my aim is to move beyond
internalism with respect to conscious experience, suggesting that the
material (sub-personal) basis of conscious experience is — in its most
basic form — world-involving. It does not follow that the sub-per-
sonal basis of all experiences are wide-reaching; that remains an open
question.
My preferred strategy for achieving this will be a possibility pro-
moting one. If successfully shouldered, it will demonstrate that a
(third) rendition of PP models in an embodied and enactive vein is a
genuine possibility, deserving serious attention. The alternative to be
developed places the anticipatory, predictive dynamics of the brain
within a larger brain–body–niche dynamic. I shall argue that a promis-
ing framework by which to integrate PP stories with the view that ‘ba-
sic minds’ are ‘extensive’ — that experience is an inescapably
dynamic relation between a subject and its species specific niche — is
Friston’s Free Energy Principle (FEP).1
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[1] The notion of ‘basic minds’ is best understood in terms of the extensive mind hypothesis
of radical enactivists, where minds, in their basic forms, are world-involving. Were we to
contrast this view with certain articulations of the extended mind hypothesis, we arrive at
the following definition of extensive minds: mind is a phenomenon that is primarily inner
Free energy represents a bound on the ‘surprisal’ inherent in the
relationship between the dynamics of an organism’s internal states
(called a generative model) and the dynamics of the environment.
Surprisal is low when an organism’s generative model(s) reliably
covaries with the rich and varied structures of the environment, and
high when there is a lack of reliable covariation — or attunement —
between the generative model and the dynamics of the niche. The
claim to be articulated is that surprisal at the sub-personal level
covaries with how the world is experienced at the personal level, and
vice versa. This foregrounds a deep continuity between the FEP and
enactivist thinking, for the FEP (or so it seems) provides a way to
understand how conscious experience emerges from living beings,
defined by their tendency to resist the second law of thermodynamics.
That is, to maintain systemic integrity via processes of self-generation
conditioned on the capacity to avoid non-anticipated states. Situated
within the enactivist framework, the FEP provides an understanding
of conscious experience as dynamically conditioned on maintaining
an upper bound on the increase of entropy. In other words, conscious
experience is enacted by free energy minimization. Conscious experi-
ence is thus nothing but forms of activities that are associated with
minimization of free energy.2 If this is correct, then the phenomenal
and the physical are not distinct or merely correlated. Echoing Hutto
and Myin, the phenomenal and the physical ‘are not two distinct
relata… standing in a relation other than identity’ (Hutto and Myin,
2013, p. 169).
As I have set things up, I am supposing that characterizations of
sub-personal dynamics constrain characterizations of conscious expe-
rience, and vice versa. But, as Dennett (1991) and Hurley (1998;
2010) rightly insist, it is problematic to think that facts about features
at one level entail facts about features at another level. However, fol-
lowing enactivists such as Ward, we might say: ‘it is natural to sup-
pose that there is an interplay between what we say at one level and at
the other’ (Ward, 2012, p. 734). If it is correct that sub-personal
surprisal covaries with the phenomenology of experience, then — cet-
eris paribus — the phenomenology of experience is based in free
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but which may, in the right circumstances, spread beyond the brain (the extended mind);
minds are primarily realized in brain–body–world dynamics (the extensive mind; see
Hutto, Kirchhoff and Myin, 2014).
[2] This way of interpreting the FEP brings another, but complementary, issue to the fore,
namely that it is because of an interplay between the personal and sub-personal that organ-
isms are driven towards maintaining an as close to optimal fit between internal generative
models and the dynamics of their species-specific Umwelt (Wexler, 2008; see also
Berthoz, 2012; Friston, 2011; and Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002).
energy minimization. Furthermore, if minimization of free energy is
realized in dynamical agent–environment couplings embedded at
multiple spatial and temporal scales (Kirchhoff, 2014), then it follows
that conscious experience is realized in dynamical brain–body–world
couplings.
So far, so good, but let us dig a little deeper, philosophically, by
returning to the issue of a potential gap between the extension of only
some of the sub-personal realizers of cognitive processes and states
and realizers of conscious experience. Recall that it might be argued
that when it comes to the realizers of conscious experience, such real-
izers — so Clark (2012) and Wheeler (this issue) argue — are
brain-bound. This claim is true, for example, if PP models are inter-
preted through the lens of the extended mind hypothesis, stating — we
saw above — that only some sub-personal realizers extend. It is this
presupposition that motivates the potential gap between some of the
realizers of sub-personal cognitive processes and those realizing con-
scious experiences. But, if it is possible to understand the FEP as con-
sistent with the extensive mind hypothesis put forth by radical
enactivists, then there is no reason to think that there is a potential gap
at all. In contrast to the extended mind hypothesis, the extensive mind
hypothesis conceives of cognitive processes (or mindfulness) as a
form of wide-reaching, world-relating activity (Hutto and Myin,
2013; Hutto, Kirchhoff and Myin, 2014). On this view, minds — in
their most basic form — are not merely, in certain circumstances,
extended, but rooted in brain–body–niche dynamics. In addition to
this, if it is possible to understand the relation between experience and
cognition as inseparable — complementary aspects of coupled
brain–body–environment dynamics — it follows that whenever cog-
nition is realized in circuits comprising brain, body, and world, so is
conscious experience (see also Silberstein, 2014).
Once we adopt an enactive interpretation of the FEP, it becomes
very difficult — if not outright inconsistent — to maintain (pace Clark
and Hohwy) that the mind, including conscious experience, is inferen-
tially secluded and exhaustively brain bound. An enactive rendition of
the FEP does not take the brain as its sole explanatory unit. Following
Gallagher and colleagues, we should conceive of the brain as partici-
pating ‘in a system, along with eyes and face and hands and voice, and
so on, that enactively anticipates and responds to its environment’
(Gallagher et al., 2013, p. 422). In adopting this enactivist account of
the brain as embedded within a larger brain–body–world dynamic,
one arrives at the view that the phenomenological world of experience
is not just realized in neural space but is a fundamentally relational
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phenomenon. How an individual experiences and responds is realized
by global brain dynamics but also by her bodily skills and habits, her
current bodily affective configuration, the people she is interacting
with, as well as norms embedded in the patterned practices within
which she is situated (Barrett and Bar, 2009; Gallagher et al., 2013;
Hutto and Kirchhoff, in press; Roepstorff, Niewöhner and Beck,
2010).
Developing the FEP along these lines (or so I shall argue) puts us in
a position to show that free energy minimization is widely realized,
i.e. realized by organismic and extra-organismic factors. This is the
first step in the articulation of conscious experience as realized in
dynamics beyond the brain. From here I shall argue that a wide real-
ization basis of free energy minimization can accommodate the
phenomenological notion of maximal grip, defined as an organism’s
‘tendency to refine its responses so as to bring the current situation
closer to an optimal gestalt’ (Dreyfus, 2002, p. 367). If this is correct,
it provides an explanation of conscious experience as essentially a
dynamic relation between perceiver and the world premised on
short-term minimization of surprisal. I shall demonstrate this by
exposing central implications of the FEP, and through reference to
empirical studies on dyadic infant–caretaker interactions and the phe-
nomenon of culture shock. However, before turning to address these
arguments, the first two steps in the paper concern (i) exposing the
argument for internalism based on PP models, and (ii) identifying two
central problems for this internalist argument, setting the stage for
what is to come in the rest of the paper.
2. From Predictive Processing to
Internalism about Experience
The basic idea underlying PP stories is that the brain — when viewed
from a certain perspective — is hidden from the external environment
much the same way that whatever might be inside a box is secluded
from whatever might be outside of it. If the brain is such a ‘black box’,
then how and by what means is it possible for the brain to ‘know’ any-
thing about the external sources from which it receives sensory input?
Consider, as Clark does, that the brain is a black box — one that
receives sensory signals from an environment external to it and is
capable of issuing motor responses, thus changing its input. As Clark
characterizes this black box scenario: ‘all that it “knows”, in any
direct sense, are the ways its own states (e.g. spike trains) flow and
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alter. In that (restricted sense), all the system has direct access to is its
own states. The world itself is thus off-limits’ (Clark, 2013, p. 183).
PP schemes enable the brain to ‘reach out’ of its black box by way
of inferential processes (to be explained). Nevertheless, it seem as if
these inferences only make it to the front door, unable to exit. The
view is that of the brain as a kind of virtual reality machine, running its
own internal fantasy-like world. This is not a straw man, far from it.
Rather, it is a resurgence of the old idea — rekindled and (arguably)
rebutted by Dennett (1991) — of an inner Cartesian Theatre. To be
clear, no one in the PP camp is a dualist — in the sense propounded by
Descartes (1641/1996) — and no one presupposes — as did Descartes
— that there is one special centre in the brain uniting conscious expe-
rience. But, the persuasive imagery of the Theatre surfaces afresh in
PP stories, although the Theatre itself — it now seems — is rooted in
global brain activity. PP is a move away from ‘“blob-ology”, with a
focus on local areas of activity, and towards functional integration,
with a focus on the functional and dynamic causal relations between
areas of activity’ (Hohwy, 2007, p. 315). Yet for all that, the mind is
thought to be ‘inferentially secluded and neuroscientifically skull-
bound’ (Hohwy, 2014, p. 1). What is the argument for this? Here I will
focus on Hohwy’s (2014) argument, which has the following
structure:
Premise 1: If PP is correct, then it implies that the brain is
self-evidencing.
Premise 2: If the brain is self-evidencing, then the mind is
secluded from the body and surrounding environment.
Premise 3: PP is correct.
Conclusion: Therefore, the brain is self-evidencing and the
mind is skull-bound, concealed from body and world.
Each of the premises and the conclusion turn on a set of assumptions
— that PP models are: inferential; explanatorily self-evidencing;
based on Bayesian inference; and entail internalism.
PP takes the form of inference to the best explanation, the latter
understood in Bayesian terms. The brain implements predictive pro-
cessing, developing and making use of hierarchical generative models
of hidden causes to best explain the sensory signals perturbing it. On
this view, the brain’s representations of external states of affairs are
encoded in top-down predictions (probabilistic generative models) of
the sensory signals. The role of bottom-up processing from the sen-
sory signals is thought of in terms of feedback on internal generative
models (Hohwy, 2013, p. 47). Hence, PP turns on a single principle:
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that on average and over time the only function of brain activity is to
minimize the ‘error’ between its predictions of sensory input on the
basis of its own generative model and the actual sensory input it
receives (Howhy, 2014, p. 2).
Prediction error refers to the discrepancy between sensory input
and active predictions of such input in virtue of the brain’s generative
model. Hierarchically inverted generative models generate predic-
tions or inferences about the impinging sensory input. The model that
generates the best prediction — the one resulting in the least error —
determines perceptual content (Hohwy, Roepstorff and Friton, 2008).
Predictive processing is thus (it seems) at root inferential.
As Hohwy explains, the ‘winning hypothesis [model] about the
world is the one with the highest posterior probability, that is, the
hypothesis that best explains away [i.e. accounts for] the sensory
input’ (Hohwy, 2014, p. 5). This means that recurrent information pro-
cessing is mediated by bottom-up prediction errors and top-down pre-
dictions (Howhy, Roepstorff and Friston, 2008). Bottom-up
prediction errors — through recurrent processing loops — optimize
the top-down predictions, thus (eventually) cancelling the prediction
error itself. This is also known as ‘explaining away’ (ibid.).
In inference to the best explanation, when an hypothesis hi best
accounts for — i.e. explains away — some occurring evidence ei, the
latter becomes evidence for the former in so far as hi accounts for ei. In
this sense, hi becomes self-evidencing. As Hohwy puts it: ‘When hi is
self-evidencing, there is an explanatory-evidentiary circle (EE-circle)
where hi explains ei and ei in turn is evidence for hi. In Bayesian terms,
the internal generative models — when inverted — generate predic-
tions (hypotheses) that explain away prediction error (the sensory evi-
dence), thus maximizing its evidence’ (Hohwy, 2014, p. 6). Prediction
error minimization — as Hohwy states — ‘thus constitutes self-evi-
dencing. This is then the doctrine of the self-evidencing brain. The
brain is an organ that approximates optimal Bayesian inference,
through prediction error minimization’ (ibid., p. 6, italics in original).
The brain can minimize prediction error by changing two quantities
on which prediction error minimization depends. It can act on the
environment, thus changing the sensory input. This is known as active
inference. Or, it can change its posterior beliefs by changing its inter-
nal states. This is perception. So how might one argue from PP,
embedded in perception–action cycles, to the truth of internalism?
The central claim in Hohwy’s story is this: perceptual activity and
active inference unfold as an internal interplay between top-down
predictions and input at the sensory periphery. This interplay creates
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an EE-circle — a sensory blanket (called a Markov blanket) — consti-
tuting an evidentiary boundary, which demarcates mind from body
and world. The blanket is ‘permeable only in the sense that inferences
can be made about the causes of sensory input hidden beyond the
boundary’ (ibid., p. 6). Experiences, then, and their material realizers,
are ‘located’ on the ‘inside’ of the EE-circle, severed from the envi-
ronment external to the sensory blanket.
3. Direct Experience and Patterned Practices:
Problems for Hohwy
The assumption that the mind ‘is locked inside the head’, akin to what-
ever might be inside a black box, is the premise of internalism. It fol-
lows from such a premise that perceiving the world must be indirect.
Furthermore, due to its internalist rendition, the brain must produce
internal models of the external source of its impinging sensory signals
— the premise of representationalism (Froese and Ikegami, 2013, p.
213). It is because of this theoretical basis that the world is ‘off-limits’
to the mind. This makes PP models seem prima facie incompatible
with embodied and enactive approaches to cognition. Enactivists
emphasize the inherent relational nature of cognition and mind,
rejecting representationalism and neurocentricism (Di Paolo and De
Jaegher, 2012). On this view, the mind is not inferentially trapped
within a black box but arises from nonlinear brain–body–niche
dynamics (Beer, 2000; Chemero, 2009; Engel, 2010; Hutto and Myin,
2013; Thompson, 2007). Such a dynamical view suggests that organ-
isms directly perceive their species-specific lifeworld (Noë, 2004)
and that what organisms perceive is in part determined by their ongo-
ing participation in patterned practices (Roepstorff, Niewöhner and
Beck, 2010).
With these embodied-enactivist principles out in the open, and
before turning to explore the free energy principle (FEP) in light of
these embodied-enactivist tenets (next section), I start by looking at
Hohwy’s account through the lens of embodied-enactive cognitive
science. I do so in order to introduce a few key issues — direct percep-
tual experience and patterned practices — that I shall make use of in
what is to come.
Let us start, then, by considering the mind–world relation itself.
Here Hohwy states that: ‘One important and, probably, unfashionable
thing that this theory tells us about the mind is that perception is indi-
rect… what we perceive is the brain’s best hypothesis, as embodied in
a high-level generative model, about the causes in the outer world’
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(Hohwy, 2007, p. 322). The embodied-enactivist view questions
(minimally, at least) the transition from purely sub-personal predic-
tion minimization to the conclusion that subjective (personal level)
experience is indirect. Suspicion arises for the account provided by
Hohwy because — at certain moments — he seems to confuse per-
sonal and sub-personal level characterizations. For example, Hohwy
sometimes talks in terms of the brain perceiving and acting.3
Enactivists would view this as a category mistake in the sense that per-
ceiving and acting are personal level features rather than sub-personal
level ones.4 Hohwy’s conception of brains as perceivers is likely to
mislead because it does not follow from the claim that sub-personal
prediction error minimization is indirect that perception, when viewed
from the personal level, must be indirect. Clark expresses a similar
worry about Hohwy’s account, as he says:
Even if our own prediction [our sub-personal machinations] is… doing
much of the heavy lifting, it remains correct to say that what we per-
ceive is not some internal representation or hypothesis but (precisely)
the world… The intervening [sub-personal] mechanisms thus introduce
no worrisome barrier between mind and world. (Clark, 2013, p. 199)
Accordingly, for Clark, perceptual experience is porous, constituting
an essentially dynamic relationship between perceiver and environ-
ment, while the brain’s sub-personal tricks and ploys may still be
thought to operate within the boundaries of skin and skull. Clark’s
restriction of the sub-personal realizers of perceptual experience is at
odds with the enactivist claim that the sub-personal basis of some con-
scious experiences criss-crosses brain–body–niche dynamics. Never-
theless, Clark’s view of experience, as involving a dynamic relation
between perceiver and the perceived, is consistent with the enactivist
view that experience is fundamentally relational.
What about the world itself? Recent work by Friston (2009; 2010;
2011; 2013) and with colleagues (Friston and Stephan, 2007; Friston,
Thornton and Clark, 2012) situates the basic hierarchical PP frame-
work within embodied action — what I referred to as active inference
above. Accordingly, an organism can minimize error prediction on
short timescales by acting in the environment, making the environ-
ment reflect regularities in the brain’s internal dynamics. So even
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[3] ‘The brain perceives by minimizing prediction error between its hypotheses about the
world through updating the parameters of those hypotheses’ (Hohwy, 2014, p. 4, italics in
original).
[4] Hurley nicely states this worry: ‘…we shouldn’t confuse the personal and subpersonal
levels. We shouldn’t suppose that the properties of vehicles must be projected into what
they represent for subject/agents, or vice versa’ (Hurley, 1998, p. 1).
within PP schemes, it seems, an organism’s environment is recognized
as playing deep and important roles in everyday activity (Kiebel et al.,
2009; see also Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014). Unfortunately Hohwy
seems unable to hang onto this important idea. He goes on to ignore
the dynamic features of the environment, treating it as a set of states of
affairs — as populated by objects having certain properties.5 But the
world is not simply made up of states of affairs.
Echoing Hutchins’ Hypothesis of Enculturated Cognition (2011), if
one reduces the world to states of affairs — conceiving of it in primar-
ily static terms — then all the cognitive ‘heavy lifting’ must come
from the brain. So it is no surprise that even Clark backtracks to the
idea that the brain does most of the heavy lifting in cognitive process-
ing. However, the world is not just comprised of states of affairs, it ‘is
dynamic, including as it does the dynamic activities of social others,
the brain and body of a focal individual are not the only possible
sources of dynamic organizing processes’ (Hutchins, 2011, p. 443).
Such a perspective on ‘the context’ highlights that human everyday
activity is embedded within various forms of patterned practices.
Dancing, communication, writing, voting, attending a music concert,
and so on, are all interpersonal practices — not merely states of affairs
such as ‘the cat is on the mat’. Such practices exhibit regularities —
they are patterned — and these shape as well as constrain the dynam-
ics of the brain’s generative models. As Roepstorff et al. note: ‘From
the inside of a practice, certain models of expectancy come to be
established, and the patterns, which over time emerge from these prac-
tices, guide perception as well as action’ (Roepstorff, Niewöhner and
Beck, 2010, p. 1056).
Crucially, for our purposes, PP models are continuous with the pat-
terned practices perspective. As Roepstorff notes: ‘Translated into
predictive coding… these practices may help establish priors or even
hyperpriors, sets of expectations that shape perception and guide
action’ (Roepstorff, 2013, p. 225; see also Roepstorff and Frith,
2012). And as Clark, in his treatment of PP, states: ‘Such a perspec-
tive, by highlighting situated practice, very naturally encompasses
various forms of longer-term material and social environmental struc-
turing… At multiple time-scales… we thus stack the dice so that we
can more easily minimize costly prediction errors in an endlessly
empowering cascade of contexts…’ (Clark, 2013, p. 195).
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[5] For Hohwy, the question is: ‘How does a system such as the brain manage to use its sen-
sory input to represent the states of affairs in the world?’ (Hohwy, 2014, p. 1, italics
added).
To sum up, it is possible for PP to converge — despite Hohwy’s
insistence to the contrary — with the enactivist view that conscious
(or subjective) experience is a dynamical relationship between
perceiver and world. This will be important for what is to come. Fur-
thermore, according to the patterned practices approach, neural pat-
terns not only aim to anticipate distant causes of sensory signals but
actually shape sociocultural practices, while also being shaped by
such sociocultural practices.6 This will be important in the discussion
of dyadic infant–caretaker interactions and the phenomenon of cul-
ture shock. The next step in the paper develops the FEP and argues
that the FEP provides the right basic tools for situating the anticipa-
tory dynamics of the brain within a larger brain–body–world dynam-
ics. Following Orlandi (2014) Anderson and Chemero (2013), and
Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014), I propose a ‘minimal’ interpretation
of the FEP, making the FEP genuinely continuous with embod-
ied-enactivist tenets. I start by giving an argument for why the
minimization of free energy is widely realized.
4. Free Energy Minimization and Wide Realization
The FEP states that all physical systems (in order to survive) must
actively resist a natural tendency for disorder (Friston, 2009; 2010;
2011; see also Ashby, 1952, and Haken, 1983). Physical systems,
including biological ones, exist far-from-thermodynamic equilib-
rium, and are therefore defined as resisting the second law of thermo-
dynamics. The second law of thermodynamics states that entropy (i.e.
a measure of disorder) of closed systems increases over time (Friston,
2010, p. 127). Thermodynamic free energy ‘is a measure of the energy
available to do useful work [so as to keep entropy within bounds]’
(Clark, 2013, p. 186).
In contrast to closed systems, biological systems are open systems
in the sense that such systems preserve their systemic integrity by
exchanging energy with their environment. If we combine thermody-
namic free energy with realization, we get the following: H is the
property of self-maintenance; X is the process of retrieving energy
from the environment; P is the process of manipulating some energy
source; and R is the process of dissipating waste into the environment.
On this view, H is realized by X, P, and R. When taken separately, X, P,
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[6] Consider, here, what Clark says: ‘The full potential of the prediction-error minimization
model of how cortical processing fundamentally operates will emerge only (I submit)
when that model is paired with an appreciation of what immersion in all those socio-cul-
tural designer environments can do…’ (Clark, 2013, p. 195).
and R are partial realizers (also called core realizers) because each is
identifiable as performing a core role in generating H. It follows that
partial realizers fail to be metaphysically sufficient for H. Contrast
partial realization with total realization. Following Wilson, we can
define a total realization of H as follows: ‘a state of S, containing any
given core realization as a proper part, that is metaphysically suffi-
cient for H’ (Wilson, 2001, p. 8). Total realizations are also referred to
as complete realizations. But, when viewed from the perspective of
the FEP, total realizations are metaphysically insufficient for realizing
H, because — following Wilson — total realizations ‘exclude the
background conditions that are necessary for there to be the appropri-
ate functioning system’ (ibid., p. 9, italics in original) This is impor-
tant when considering the FEP, because only in conjunction with the
fact that the environment itself ‘unfolds in a thermodynamically struc-
tured and lawful way’ (Friston and Stephan, 2007, p. 422) is total real-
ization sufficient — metaphysically — for H. That is, free energy
minimization is conditioned on the fact ‘that the environment unfolds
in a thermodynamically structured way and lawful way and biological
systems embed these laws into their anatomy’ (ibid., p. 422). If this is
correct, then extra-organismic features of the environment are neces-
sarily part of the material realization base for an organism’s capacity
to reverse an increase of entropic disorder over time (Kirchhoff,
2014).
5. Free Energy Minimization,
Optimal Models, and Enactive Minds
As we have seen, the FEP starts by stating that any living, self-orga-
nizing system is driven to maintain an upper bound on entropy (i.e. to
avoid systemic death). In its information-theoretic rendition, the
long-term (distal) minimization of thermodynamic free energy trans-
lates into a short-term (proximal) imperative to minimize surprisal,
where this amounts to reducing prediction error (Friston, 2011, p. 92).
In other words, organisms that successfully minimize free energy ‘do
so by minimizing their tendency to enter into this kind of surprising
(that is, non-anticipated) state’ (Friston, Thornton and Clark, 2012, p.
1). Thus, surprisal is formulated as the discrepancy between internal
generative models and the actual structure of the environment. If free
energy is low, then there is a highly tuned fit between internal neuro-
dynamics and the dynamics of the environment, and free energy is
high if there is dis-attunement.
The relationship between the thermodynamic and information-the-
oretic rendition of the FEP is the following: ‘the Bayesian brain and
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predictive coding are… seen as a consequence of… this fundamental
imperative [of free energy minimization]’ (Friston, 2013, p. 212–3).
The implications of this are numerous. Here I want to unpack an
important implication for our purposes, because by minimizing long-
term free energy, and short-term surprisal, organisms become a model
of their environment in which they are always already situated. As
Friston says: ‘the free energy principle takes the existence of agents
[organisms] as its starting point and concludes that each phenotype or
agent embodies an optimal model of its econiche’ (2011, p. 89, italics
in original). As Friston et al. specify:
We must here understand ‘model’ in the most inclusive sense, as com-
bining interpretive dispositions, morphology, and neural architecture,
and as implying a highly tuned ‘fit’ between the active, embodied
organism and the embedded environment. (Friston, Thornton and
Clark, 2012, p. 6)
For Friston, an ‘agent does not have a model of its world — it is a
model. In other words, the form, structure, and states of our embodied
brains do not contain a model of the sensorium — they are that model’
(Friston, 2013, p. 213). Hence, the function of the generative model is
not to represent the world but to enable an organism to respond adap-
tively to its environment. This is achieved, as Bruineberg and Rietveld
note, ‘in such a way that a robust brain–body–environment system is
maintained’ (2014, p. 7, italics in original).
We are now at the doorstep for an account of enactive minds, the
view that the material realizers of conscious experience are wide —
world-involving. Consider, first, that PP can accommodate the
enactivist view that conscious experience only occurs as a dynamical
relation between perceiver and perceived, ‘that experience only ever
occurs in environment-involving circumstances…’ (Hutto and Myin,
2013, p. 160). In terms of the FEP, an agent does not create a model
(representation) of its environment — it is a model. But this still does
not completely open the door to conscious experience as widely real-
ized for — as we saw — it does not follow that the sub-personal realiz-
ers of experience are based in extra-neural features. Second, PP
models, as we have seen, are compatible with the idea that generative
models shape regularities embedded in patterned practices, and vice
versa, securing a dynamical attunement between the dynamics of
internal generative models and dynamics of the environment. Yet we
are still not home, for it is possible to accept a wide realization base for
some sub-personal cognitive processes and states, while denying this
in relation to conscious experience. What seems to prevent full entry
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for ‘going wide’ about conscious experience turns on the issue that a
purely neural interplay between top-down predictions and bottom-up
error signals constitute (so it is assumed) a sensory blanket (a Markov
blanket), inferentially secluding mind, and consequently conscious
experience, from body and world.
A Markov blanket is effectively a statistical boundary comprised of
an ensemble of nodes partitioned into internal and external states —
the interdependencies among the states constitute the blanket. Let us
assume, for the sake of argument, that neural states (call these internal
states) are inferentially secluded from hidden states (call these exter-
nal states), and let us further assume that internal states can minimize
their prediction error either by sensory states (call this perception) or
by active states (call this active inference). Does it follow from this
that conscious experience and its material realization base is entirely
internal and brain bound? An answer is provided in the dependencies
between the states making up the Markov blanket:
External states cause sensory states that influence — but are not influ-
enced by — internal states, while internal states cause active states that
influence — but are not influenced by — external states. Crucially, the
dependencies induced by Markov blankets create a circular causality
that is reminiscent of the action–perception cycle. The circular causal-
ity here means that external states cause changes in internal states, via
sensory states, while the internal states couple back to the external
states through active states — such that internal and external states
cause each other in a reciprocal fashion. This circular causality may be
a fundamental and ubiquitous causal architecture for self-organization.
(Friston, 2013, pp. 2–3, italics added)
For Friston, then, long-term minimization of free energy and short-
term minimization of surprisal is embedded in dynamical couplings
between internal and external states, comprising a widely realized
dynamical system — remember, a dynamical system can have param-
eters on each side of the skin (Silberstein, 2014, p. 302). Now, sup-
pose we agree — with Friston — that an agent is an optimal model of
its niche, and if a model is comprised of internal and external states
co-constituting each other, we thus agree that an agent is a dynamical
system best characterized as a coupled agent–environment system
embedded at multiple spatial and temporal scales. If this is correct, it
dissolves Hohwy’s argument for internalism precisely because cogni-
tive activity is realized in a brain–body–environment dynamic. More-
over, if the cognitive and the phenomenal are not separable, then this
gives us a wide sub-personal realization base for the enactivist view
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that conscious experience in inherently wide-reaching and
world-involving.
Before turning to consider how an enactivist rendition of the FEP
can illuminate the phenomenological notion of maximal grip, I want
to consider one possible way for proponents of PP models to secure
internalism about conscious experience. Let us suppose, for the sake
of argument, that phenomenality is a property of the brain’s represen-
tation-based machinations. In other words, it is because of its repre-
sentation-based inferences — one removed from body and world —
that conscious experiences emerge. Minimally this makes representa-
tion-based inferences necessary for the existence of phenomenal
experience.
To take the sting out of this possibility, let us start by considering
that thermodynamic free energy is ‘a physical quantity that need not
be seen as representing anything’ (Orlandi, 2014, p. 81, italics added).
In so far as this is correct, then the FEP is non-representational in its
primary form. Suppose one grants that thermodynamic free energy is
non-representational, does it follow that free energy — in its informa-
tion-theoretic rendition — is non-representational? There are reasons
supporting that even short-term minimization of surprisal can be
understood in non-representational terms. Here I will consider three
reasons.
First, if thermodynamic free energy need not be construed as repre-
sentation-based, and if this is the primary notion — viz. the root for-
mulation of the FEP — then there is no principled reason to suppose
that surprisal minimization must be representation-based.
Second, consider — as Anderson and Chemero (2013) do — that
there are two distinct and incompatible interpretations of ‘prediction’
available. The first sense of prediction is akin to standard inferences in
logic in the sense that they are propositionally construed. Thus to
argue that predictions in predictive processing are propositional boils
down to the claim that the brain infers the hidden causes of its sensory
input based on propositionally structured hypotheses. The other sense
of the term prediction is unescorted by propositions. As Bruineberg
and Rietveld point out, within the FEP scheme, talk of predictions and
inferences is
much more minimal and does not involve any propositions: any dynam-
ical system Acoupled with another B can be said to ‘infer’ [or ‘predict’]
the ‘hidden cause’ of its ‘input’ (the dynamics of B) when it reliably
covaries with the dynamics of B and it is robust to the noise inherent in
the coupling. (Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014, p. 7, italics added)
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This second sense of prediction is much closer allied to dynamical
notions such as attunement and covariance. Such construals are con-
sistent with the suggestion that ‘predictions might be embodied in the
temporal structure of both stimulus-evoked and ongoing activity’
(Engel, Fries and Singer, 2001, p. 704). But temporal neurodynamics
need not be interpreted as representation involving.
Third, and finally, consider the following point that Orlandi makes
regarding the notion of ‘prior’ in predictive processing: ‘priors in pre-
dictive coding… are not used as premises in perceptual inferences…
They rather have the simple function of marking a hypothesis as more
or less probable’ (Orlandi, 2014, p. 82). If this is correct, then priors
are more akin to ‘valves’ than to inferences. This is because priors —
in their responsiveness to environmental input — ‘regulate what
neuronal arrangements get to be tested by incoming stimuli’ (ibid., p.
82). As such priors function as constraints — driving internal dynam-
ics towards a particular neuronal configuration.
Thus, one need not be committal to the claim that surprisal is repre-
sentational in nature. As a result any attempt to vindicate internalism
about phenomenality by reference to the representation-based opera-
tions of predictive processing is bereft of its initial plausibility.
6. Optimal Models and Maximal Grip
So far, so good, but on the face of it, the FEP seems hard to shoehorn
with personal-level subjective experience given its rather narrow
focus on sub-personal minimization of surprisal. However, this read-
ing of the FEP obscures from view — as Friston et al. are quick to
point out — that although ‘the psychological [personal level] notion
of surprise is distinct, events with high surprisal are generally surpris-
ing’ (Friston, Thornton and Clark, 2012, p. 1). In enactivist terms, the
reason for this is that conscious experience is dynamically condi-
tioned on sub-personal minimization of surprisal realized in a tempo-
rally extended organism–environment system. It foregrounds the tight
interplay between characterizations at the sub-personal level with
characterizations at the personal level, and vice versa. This is an
extremely attractive feature of the FEP; in part because it suggests a
deep continuity between the personal and sub-personal; but also
because it provides a naturalistic account of the phenomenological
view that organisms are driven towards maintaining a maximal grip
on the situation within which they are interacting. What is central to
this notion, Bruineberg and Rietveld correctly put it, is ‘that the
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individual experiences the situation in terms of a deviation of an opti-
mum’ (2014, p. 4). As they observe, following Merleau-Ponty:
For each object, as for each picture in an art gallery, there is an optimum
distance from which it requires to be seen, a direction viewed from
which it vouchsafes most of itself: at a shorter or greater distance we
have merely a perception blurred through excess or deficiency. We
therefore tend toward the maximum of visibility, and seek a better focus
as with a microscope. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002, p. 352)
Maximal grip, in its phenomenological guise, is thus the organism’s
tendency (over distal and proximal time) to attune its responses to a
constantly varying and complex suite of opportunities for action.
Such attunements, as Dreyfus points out, ‘do not require semantically
interpretable brain representations…’ (Dreyfus, 2002, p. 383). In
other words, in optimizing one’s grip on the situation, the distance
between me and a piece of art, say, need not be encoded in representa-
tion-based predictions, but rather is ‘felt as a lack of balance’
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002, p. 352). Note that this suggests that there
is an affective component to experience, implying that affect non-triv-
ially shapes conscious experience.
A PP model providing an explanation of the relationship between
embodied affectivity and sub-personal minimization of surprisal is
Barrett and Bar’s Affective Prediction Hypothesis (2009). According
to this hypothesis ‘responses signaling an object’s salience, relevance
or value do not occur as a separate step after the object is identified.
Instead, affective responses support vision from the very moment that
visual stimulation begins’ (ibid., p. 1325). If this is true, it follows that
we do not just perceive the environment in a cold, detached fashion;
rather, perceiving is already to be in an affective state such that bodily
affective changes are part and parcel of the phenomenology of experi-
ence. In the terms of the FEP, an organism’s model when perceiving an
object, person, and/or situation is already ‘set up’ — viz. it is config-
ured — in accordance with prior associations involving not merely
internal neural circuitry but an entire body adjustment. Thus part of
the realization base of conscious experience comprises embodied
affectivity.
Concordance — or reliable covariance — between internal genera-
tive models and environmental structures gives rise to pleasurable
experiences, say. This falls out of the idea that experiences are ines-
capably affective. If this is true, it solves a particular problem raised
by critics of the FEP, called the Dark Room Problem. It states, if low
degrees of surprisal are necessary for survival (adaptation), why, then,
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do agents not just find the closest dark room and stay there? First, any
particular minimization of free energy solution enabling adaptive fit-
ness is unique to each species and their species-specific niche
(Friston, Thornton and Clark, 2012, p. 2). Second, it is because of this
that every single organism optimizes (or strives towards) a model of
its environment — with the model optimized to dynamically antici-
pate and act in that niche. Third, it follows from the first and second
point that ‘a dark room will afford low levels of surprise if, and only if,
the agent has been optimized by evolution… to predict and inhabit it.
Agents that predict rich stimulating environments will find the “dark
room” surprising and will leave at the earliest opportunity’ (ibid., p.
3). Humans are such agents. In phenomenological terms, if a maximal
— or close to maximal — grip is necessary for well-being, say, then
one would expect distress to be prevalent in cases where the situation
deviates too far from an optimal gestalt — as in the Dark Room sce-
nario. Transposed to the FEP, surprisal is low when internal genera-
tive models reliably covary with their environment, and vice versa,
which just is to experience the world in a certain way.
Sometimes organisms or individuals may find themselves in situa-
tions where surprisal is high, viz. where the dynamic attunement
between inner generative models and the world is less than optimal —
where, as Wexler puts it, ‘a discrepancy between internal and external
structures… is too extreme to be amenable to any… restorative
actions’ (Wexler, 2008, p. 170). In other words, if, over time, the kind
of practices that individuals find themselves participating in comes to
exhibit regularities — patterns of expectancy — then one might rea-
sonably assume that disruptions in such patterned practices may result
in a particular — non-anticipated — phenomenology.
Consider, by way of example, studies revealing how infants contin-
uously configure and adjust their behaviour based on the social, emo-
tional responsiveness of those they are interacting with. Yet infants
are — or so it seems — limited in their capacity to act in situations (to
reap the full benefits of active inference) that would otherwise enable
them to minimize discrepancies between their generative models and
the dynamics of the environment. It has been shown that if — after a
period of coordinated interactions, where both infant and caretaker
synchronize their bodily expressions — a sudden abrupt change in the
caretaker’s bodily expressions is introduced, infants react by showing
signs of distress such as sobering and gazing away (Adamson and
Frick, 2003). In fact, the studies show, even after the caretaker
re-enacts her responsiveness, the ‘effects of the [interaction] distur-
bance persist as a spillover’ (Nagy, 2008, p. 1782).
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Because of this, an intervention desynchronizing emerging regular-
ities embedded in shared practices will — ceteris paribus — leave
infants with an experience of distress. Recall that for the patterned
practices approach patterns exhibiting regularities may, over time,
establish priors. Indeed, as Roepstorff puts it, ‘human priors may not
only be driven by statistical properties in the environment, picked up
by individual experience, or hardwired into the developing cognitive
system. They are also a result of shared expectations that are commu-
nicated in interactions’ (Roepstorff, 2013, p. 225).
Crucially, in the case of dyadic infant–caretaker interactions, the
anticipatory dynamics of generative models, although necessary for
maintaining patterns of coordinated activity, are not sufficient in and
of themselves. In support of this, it is insightful to draw a distinction
between what De Jaegher, Di Paolo and Gallagher (2010) call interac-
tive explanation and individualist (or internalist) explanation. Intern-
alist explanations rely on purely individual considerations appealing,
for example, to neural mechanisms. Interactive explanations, by con-
trast, are based on social interaction playing a constitutive and
enabling role in the explanation of some phenomenon. The patterned
interactions between infant and caretaker cannot simply be screened
off as mere contextual or background conditions for minimizing sub-
personal surprisal precisely because the synchronous interactions
between infant and caretaker are constitutive of the shared dynamic
between the two. In terms of PP, this is sometimes called mutual pre-
diction error minimization. As Friston and Frith point out:
[I]f there is a shared narrative or dynamic that both brains subscribe to,
they can predict each other exactly, at least for short periods of time…
when two or more (formally similar) active inference schemes are cou-
pled to each other… the result of this coupling is called generalized syn-
chronization. (Friston and Frith, 2015, p. 2)
Consequently, one cannot adopt an internalist explanation to provide
a proper explanation of dyadic infant–caretaker interactions. Indeed,
given the reciprocal couplings between internal and external states,
the phenomenology of the infant’s conscious experience fails to be
realized entirely in brain-bound processes.
One could attempt to problematize this conclusion. The root cause
of this suspicion takes us back into the heart of discussions surround-
ing the FEP. Recall that the FEP is based on the single imperative that,
in order to maximize adaptive fitness, organisms must strive towards
reducing free energy. It is because of this imperative that predictive
processing is a result of long-term free energy minimization. Never-
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theless, as Clark argues, ‘the issue turns on where we want to place our
immediate bets, and perhaps on the Aristotelian distinction between
proximate and ultimate causation’ (Clark, 2013, p. 235). That is, even
if the ultimate (distal evolutionary and/or developmental) cause of
free energy minimization must appeal to bodily and environmental
factors, ‘the proximal cause (the mechanism) of large amounts of
surprisal reduction may well be the operation of a cortical processing
regime’ (ibid.). The crux of the worry is the following: if one wants to
explain adaptive fitness (phenotypic traits), then an appeal to long-
term free energy minimization is justified — a process of free energy
minimization which may have its material basis in agent–environment
couplings at multiple spatial and temporal scales. However, if one’s
aim is to explain how organisms minimize surprisal here-and-now,
then distal or ultimate causal explanations misfire. For proximate
explanations, so Clark thinks, one must look ‘inside’ the organism, to
the neural basis of generative models.
This seems correct in cases where, for example, the existence of
certain traits or mechanisms — distal sensing, say — is explained in
terms of adaptive advantages of developing such traits or mecha-
nisms. But it is not clear that explanatory reference to distal causes in
order the ground proximal explanations is problematic in each and
every case. For enactivists, the phenomenology of experience must be
understood as a dynamical relationship between perceiver and per-
ceived, appealing to interactions and aspects of the environment
(Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 177). Such appeals necessarily incorporate
history and extra-organismic features.
Consider, by way of example, the phenomenon of culture shock,
where experiences of distress and alienation, say, are a result of major
discrepancies between internal anticipatory dynamics and the external
reality. A case in point is 13-year-old Eva Hoffman, who, with her par-
ents, left Poland in 1959 for Vancouver, Canada. Although she had her
immediate family by her side, everything else in her phenomeno-
logical world had changed. As she explains, ‘the country of my child-
hood lives within me with a primacy that is a form of love… It has fed
me language, perceptions, sounds…It has given me the colors and the
furrows of reality, my first loves’ (Hoffman, 1989, pp. 74–5; quoted in
Wexler, 2008, p. 175). Indeed, after only three nights in Vancouver,
upon wakening from a dream, she wonders:
[W]hat has happened to me in this new world? I don’t know. I don’t see
what I’ve seen, don’t comprehend what’s in front of me. I’m not filled
with language anymore, and I have only a memory of fullness to
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anguish me with the knowledge that, in this dark and empty state, I don’t
really exist. (Hoffman, 1989, p. 180; quoted in Wexler, 2008, p. 175)
When ‘she attempts to take in her new environment the requisite inter-
nal structures are lacking or the old structures are obstructing’
(Wexler, 2008, p. 176). Similar to infant–caretaker interactions, shifts
in subjective experience during immigration is — when viewed from
within the FEP — based in a lack of reliable covariation between the
agent’s anticipatory dynamics (its generative model) and the local
environmental setting.
What exact role (if any) do developmental and distal learning
explanations have with respect to providing the best explanation of
the phenomenology of experience in cases of culture shock? The first
thing to note is that priors — the ‘valves’ tuning inner anticipatory pat-
terns towards a unique configuration — may be acquired, attuning
them to particular regularities in an individual’s lifeworld. Consider-
ing Eva’s current (Canadian) context, does it follow that the neural
parameters — set during her life in Poland — are sufficient for
explaining here-and-now subjective experience? Enactivist thinking
denies this. A FEP-based reason supporting the enactivist view is that
short-term proximal explanations are grounded by distal explana-
tions. That is, short-term minimization of surprisal escapes explana-
tion in the absence of long-term free energy minimization. Another
reason to think that neural mechanisms are necessary but not suffi-
cient concerns the role of patterned practices in constraining internal
anticipatory dynamics. When viewed at an instant t, it is not apparent
from the neural activity alone that the phenomenology of Eva’s expe-
rience has the quality it has. To assume otherwise would be to commit
what Hurley coins the internal end point error, viz. that after matura-
tion neural mechanisms alone explain ‘how experience works, as well
as what it is like’ (Hurley, 2010, p. 142). What best explains the phe-
nomenology of here-and-now experience is nothing like the inner end
point scenario but comprises what Hurley dubs a characteristic
extended dynamic — an explanation of why the quality of experience
takes the form it does (see also Hurley and Noë, 2003). In the case of
Eva, any such explanation must take into consideration her past
involvement in patterned practices and how such involvement attuned
her anticipatory capacities. Crucially, such an explanation needs to be
paired with explanatory sensitivity to the present patterned practices
making up Eva’s new environment. In other words, when we explain
Eva’s phenomenal experience, we cannot — as Hutto and Myin put it
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— ‘help but mention environment-involving interactions’ (2013, p.
177).
7. Conclusion
As mentioned in the beginning, my overall aim in this paper has been
to articulate a possible interpretation of the FEP along embodied-
enactivist lines. What this allows for is a move away from ‘Cartesian’
views of predictive-driven processing, bringing to the fore an expla-
nation of world-involving conscious experience as widely realized in
dynamical brain–body–environment couplings. Exploring conscious
experience from an FEP perspective accommodates the view that
phenomenality is dynamically conditioned on free energy minimiza-
tion, thereby grounding conscious experience in living organisms.
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